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F or many concerned citizens and consumers, international labor stan-dards have a strong intuitive appeal as a remedy to address poorworking conditions and low wages in developing countries. Theunderlying rationale is straight-forward: if we could pressure multi-
national corporations to significantly improve the working conditions and wages
for unskilled workers in the developing world, we would not only improve the
lives of hundreds of millions of the poorest workers, but companies operating
in developed countries would no longer be forced to compete "unfairly" with
developing country manufacturers who can draw on unlimited pools of cheap
labor.
Others, including Jagdish Bhagwati at Columbia University, have argued
that efforts to impose a "living wage" or improve working conditions in develop-
ing countries may lead to higher labor costs, which could in turn hurt the very
workers these movements seek to protect. How? Companies may decrease
employment, relegating these workers to even worse jobs or no jobs at all.
Nicholas Kristof, editorialist for the New York Times, is probably the most visible
proponent of this view. Kristof argues that what the world needs is not fewer
sweatshops but more, since they offer the only way out of crippling rural
poverty for hundreds of millions of the world's poorest workers."
Hand in hand with the rising interest in labor standards, many labor
rights activists have turned to public relations campaigns that target multina-
tional companies in order to pressure them to improve the conditions of their
workers. Corporate giants with strong name-brand recognition such as Nike,
Reebok, Adidas, and the Gap have all become the focus of extremely well coor-
dinated ad campaigns and consumer boycotts that have spread throughout hun-
dreds of college campuses. Surprisingly, however, there has been almost no
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research that analyzes how anti-sweatshop campaigns have affected the very
workers that they are designed to assist.
Does anti-sweatshop aaivism actually help or harm workers in develop-
ing countries? Using data on Indonesian manufacturing from 1990-1996, we
examined the extent to which anti-sweatshop activism affeaed wages and
employment in districts where Nike, Reebok, Adidas, and other brand-name
plants were located. We also compared these
changes to changes brought about through the A u • "^ x * J" • '"*""T'""T"
o t> b b " ^ ^ Ann Harrison is Professor of Agricultural and
national Indonesian minimum wage legislation Resource Economics at the University of
that affected all regions and all firms. This California, Berkeley, and a Research Associate
enabled us to compare the effeas (on both '^ ^^^ ^ "^'°""' ^^^^^^ °^  Economic Research.
wages and employment) of government-man- ^^son Scorse is an Assistant Professor at the
J ^ J . „ * -^ u *u xr . X Monterey Institute of International Studies.
dated wage improvements with the effects of
the more unconventional tactic of anti-sweat-
shop activism. (Our analysis ends in 1996 because the currency crisis that
erupted in 1997 makes it almost impossible lo disentangle macro-economic
shocks from any policies targeted at the labor market.)
Indonesia presents an ideal case study for two reasons. First, anti-sweat-
shop campaigns targeted a number of firms in Indonesia where Nike, Reebok,
and Adidas all have multiple faaories and contractors. Second, the Indonesian
government was the target of United States government efforts to improve labor
market conditions through the threat of trade sanctions. Several times during
the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. government threatened to withdraw special privi-
leges extended to Indonesian exporters through the Generalized System of Pref-
erences (GSP) unless the Indonesian government responded with steps to
improve working conditions. The government's main response was to make
minimum wages a central component of its labor market policies in the 1990s.
Pressures Faced by Manufacturing Enterprises
in Indonesia in the 1990s
Between 1987 and 1995, American groups filed seven petitions with the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) claiming that Indonesian labor rights laws
were not being enforced by the Indonesian government and that Indonesia's
preferential trade status under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
should be revoked.^ These petitions focused on seven major labor rights' viola-
tions: obstruction of the right to organize, restrictions on civil servants, the right
to strike, the intervention of security authorities in labor disputes, restriaions of
workers' access to appeal, limited sanctions against employers, and unfair
restrictions on the right to work.
Under the GSP system, participating countries face lower duties (or no
duties at all) on their goods that are exported to the United States. Therefore,
maintaining GSP status is economically important for recipient nations, and the
threat of revoking it can apply significant pressure on governments to change
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F I G U R E I . Daily MinimumWage in Indonesia, 1990-1996 (in $US)
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their policies. One legal basis for revoking GSP status is evidence of human
rights violations or violation of labor laws.
When President Clinton came into office in 1992, the USTR agreed to
review Indonesia's GSP status. Although the Indonesian government flatly
denied any violations of labor rights, for the next two years the Indonesian gov-
ernment took small steps to improve the conditions of workers by easing restric-
tions on unions and promising to enforce higher minimum wages. Although
wages were not an issue raised in the GSP petitions, the Indonesian government
decided to make improvements on the wage front instead of more comprehen-
sive labor rights reform that had been highlighted by the American labor rights
groups. This also allowed the government to quell rising labor unrest, since the
major demand in the growing number of strikes during this time period (fueled
by the reluctance of the Indonesian government to crack down while under
greater international scrutiny) was compliance with the legally mandated mini-
mum wage. Although the U.S. did not revoke Indonesia's GSP privileges and the
USTR's review process waned after Clinton's 1994 visit to Indonesia, from 1990
throughl996 the average daily minimum wage in Indonesia (valued in $US)
rose almost 150 percent (see Figure 1), and the Indonesian government contin-
ued to issue promises to more strictly enforce minimum wage compliance.
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F I G U R E 2 . Output Generated by Foreign and Exporting Firms in Indonesia, 1990-1996
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At the same time as the minimum wage was soaring, Indonesia's entry
into international markets also increased dramatically (see Figure 2). The manu-
facturing census shows that the percentage of manufactured output that was
exported almost doubled between 1990 and 1996, from approximately 17 per-
cent to 32 percent of final sales. In addition, the presence of foreign investors
also increased. The percentage of manufacturing output accounted for by foreign
firms rose from 13 percent of output in 1990 to 21 percent of total manufactur-
ing output in 1996.
While all of this was occurring, the conditions of workers in Indonesia
received increased media attention, and the anti-sweatshop movement gained
significant momentum, particularly in the United States. Indonesia is home to
factories that subcontract to some of America's most popular brand name
footwear and apparel companies, such as Nike, Adidas, and Reebok. The mid-
1990s witnessed the apex of the anti-sweatshop movement.^ Must of the focus
on Indonesia (and Nike in particular) was initiated by Jeff Ballinger, who was
awarded consecutive grants from U.S.A.LD. to study the situation of Indonesian
workers at Nike plants in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1992, Harper's mag-
azine published a short piece by Ballinger entitled "The New Free-Trade Heel:
Nike's Jump on the Back of Asian Workers." In 1993, CBS broadcast a report on
the plight of Nike workers in Indonesia featuring Ballinger, while in 1994 many
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F I G U R E 3. Articles about Indonesia and Sweathshops/Child Labor in Major Newspapers,
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periodicals, including The New Republic, Rolling Stone, The New York Times, Foreign
Affairs, and The Economist also ran articles criticizing Nike's labor practices.'*
Figure 3 shows the number of articles in major newspapers just on
Indonesia and "sweatshops" or Indonesia and "child labor" from a LexisNexis
search for the years 1990-1996. Whereas the number of articles was essentially
zero in 1990 they steadily increased, peaking in 1996. Figure 4 shows the num-
ber of articles in major newspapers around the world on "sweatshops" and
"child labor" during this same period. The pattern is quite similar: while there
were a relatively small number of articles in 1990, the volume of articles steadily
increased to 1996.
In summary, during the 1990s Indonesia simultaneously experienced
both inward pressure to increase wages (the increased national minimum wage)
and direct external pressure to improve wages as well as working conditions
(from anti-sweatshop activists). Most theories of labor markets would suggest
that this upward pressure on wages and conditions of work could make labor
more costly to employers and reduce the demand for labor, possibly leading to
less employment. Our research decomposes the relative effects of these two
forms of wage pressure on both average wages for (primarily low-wage) Indone-
sian workers and employment in Indonesia during this time period.^
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F I G U R E 4 . Articles about Sweatshops and Child Labor in Major Newspapers from 1990-1996
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Minimum Wage Compliance Among
Foreign, Exporters, and Domestic Firms in Indonesia
Using the plant-level data for Indonesia, we calculated average produc-
tion worker wages relative to the statutory minimum from 1990 through 1996.^
Since the minimum wage technically only applies to base wages, we computed
compliance by using the plant's average wage, which is defined as basic annual
monetary compensation divided by the number of workers. One shortcoming
of this approach, which could only be addressed using employer-employee
matched data, is that there could be a bias in average wages if new workers
are paid less than existing ones. This could be a significant problem in growing
establishments. However, the evidence suggests that the spread in wages
between different types of unskilled workers became quite narrow due to the
growing importance of the minimum wage.
Figure 5 compares compliance with minimum wage laws for firms with
and without foreign ownership. As indicated in Figure 5, the percentage of
domestic firms paying the minimum wage to production workers ranged from
around 63 percent in 1990, to a low of less than 40 percent in 1995."^  In the mid
1990s, significantly less than half of all domestic enterprises paid an average
wage to production workers that exceeded the statutory minimum. Compliance
rates for foreign firms during the mid-1990s were nearly double those for
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F I G U R E 5. Firm Compliance with Minimum Wage Laws for Production Workers Based on
Domestic or Foreign Ownership in Indonesia, 1990-1996
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domestic enterprises. While less than 40 percent of domestically owned enter-
prises paid production workers average wages which exceeded the minimum
wage in 1995, 70 percent of foreign firms did. At the beginning of the decade,
almost 90 percent of all foreign enterprises paid average wages that equaled or
exceeded the statutory minimum. While compliance rates fell in the mid-1990s
when real minimum wages soared, foreign firms still complied with minimum
wage laws at rates 30 percent higher than domestic firms.
Figure 6 compares the extent of minimum wage compliance across
plants that exported a percentage of their sales abroad versus those oriented
exclusively towards the domestic market. Over the entire time period, the per-
centage of exporters that complied with the minimum wage laws for produaion
workers was 15 to 20 percentage points higher than for plants that only pro-
duced for the domestic market.
These broad trends suggest that multinationals and other firms exposed to
international competition were more likely to comply with minimum wage leg-
islation. However, none of the trends outlined above control for firm characteris-
tics such as size, age of the plant, the level of technology, or worker
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F I G U R E 6. Firm Compliance with Minimum Wage Lav^ s for Production Workers Based
Export Status in Indonesia, 1990-1996
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characteristics such as gender or education, which oversimplifies the analysis.
In our analysis that controls for these faaors, we still found that foreign and
exporting firms were more likely to comply with the minimum wage.^ Our
research suggests that if a foreign owner were to take over a domestic enterprise,
compliance with minimum wage legislation for produaion workers would
increase by 20 percent. Furthermore, an exporting firm was 6 percent more
likely to comply with minimum wage legislation for production workers than
a non-exporter.
Unsurprisingly, the higher rates of compliance with the minimum wage
for foreign and exporting firms correspond to overall higher wages paid by for-
eign and exporting firms. The first three columns of Table 1 show the average
wages for firms outside of textiles, footwear, and apparel (TFA) in Indonesia in
1990 and 1996, as well as the change. The wages paid by foreign firms were on
average more than three times those paid by domestic firms in 1990, For
exporters, average wages were more than 70 percent higher than domestic firms
in 1990.
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In summary, foreign and exporting firms had overall significantly higher
rates of compliance with the minimum wage in Indonesia during the period
1990-1996, and also paid significantly higher wages. We now look more closely
at the textile, footwear, and apparel (TFA) sector.
The Effect of Anti-Sweatshop Activism
on Wages in Indonesia
In the early 1990s, wages at TFA factories were amongst the lowest in all
of Indonesia. Average annual wages in Indonesia during the period 1990 to 1996
are reported in Table 1; all wages are in 1996 U.S. constant dollars. Column 1 of
Table 1 shows that between 1990 and 1996, annual production worker wages in
domestic enterprises outside of TFA increased from about US$483 to US$661.
Column 2 reports wages for foreign-owned enterprises not in TFA sectors, while
column 3 reports wages for non-TFA exporters. In 1990, non-TFA firms with
foreign equity paid more than three times the wages of domestic enterprises. By
1996, however, the gap had decreased: foreign firms paid only about two and
half times as much as domestic enterprises in the non-TFA sectors. Exporters
also paid higher wages than firms producing solely for the domestic market:
about 70 percent more in 1990, but only 40 percent more in 1996.
The story is completely different for firms in TFA. Columns 4 through 6
report average wages for domestic, foreign, and exporting TFA plants. The first
thing worthy of note is that domestic TFA (column 4) and domestic non-TFA
(column 1) plants paid remarkably similar wages. These results are reassuring
because they suggest that the composition of workers across TFA and non-TFA
152 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEV\/ VOL 48. NO.2
improving the uonartions ot Workers? Minimum Wage Legislation and Anti-Sweatshop Activism
plants was not too different. However, both foreign and exporting enterprises
paid their unskilled workers significantly less in TFA plants than in other sectors.
In 1990, workers in foreign TFA plants were paid half as much as workers at
other foreign plants; exporters in TFA plants paid their workers 30 percent less
than other exporters. These large differences were one of the primary factors
that contributed to the focus of anti-sweatshop activists on workers in TFA
plants. However, by 1996 the gap in wages between TFA and non-TFA plants
had narrowed considerably, particularly among exporters.
The difference-in-difference (DID) is reported in columns 7 through 9.
The DID technique makes it possible to isolates changes due to specific variables
of interest from underlying trends, through the use of a control and a treatment
group; in this case, the TFA seaors is the treatment group and all other sectors
are the control. The idea is that the difference in how these groups have changed
over time can be attributed to specific differences between the control and the
treatment groups. Using this technique, our results indicate that wage increases
for TFA workers were significantly higher in exporting and foreign-owned estab-
lishments. In 1996, the difference in wages between exporting TFA and export-
ing non-TFA plants amounted to only $19 per employee per year, and this
difference—reported in row 2 column 9—is not statistically significant. The gap
between wages in foreign non-TFA firms and foreign TFA firms also narrowed,
but by less: foreign non-TFA firms continued to pay about $650 more per
worker in annual salary in 1996 (row 2, column 8). Although domestic TFA and
domestic non-TFA plants continued to pay similar wages, domestic TFA plants
received smaller wage increases than workers in the non-TFA sectors. This sug-
gests that the wage benefits from anti-sweatshop activism were limited to work-
ers in export-oriented or foreign-owned plants.
The results in Table 1 suggest very different patterns of wage growth for
TFA plants in the 1990s; these are highlighted in Figure 7, which shows the
changes in wages between 1990 and 1996 by foreign ownership, export status,
and sector. While unskilled workers in other exporting and foreign-owned
plants generally received smaller wage increases than the rest of the manufac-
turing labor force, the opposite was true for workers in TFA factories. One likely
reason is that exporters and multinational firms outside of textiles and apparel
factories already paid higher wages, and consequently did not have to increase
wages as much to remain in compliance with minimum wage legislation. How-
ever, in TFA plants, unskilled wages grew 30 to 40 percent in real terms between
1990 and 1996.
This observation is striking: in only a few short years, workers in some of
the poorest paid sectors in Indonesia experienced extremely rapid wage growth.
Given that it is unlikely that these workers experienced productivity increases at
rates that could justify these wage increases, the question arises whether anti-
sweatshop activism may have provided the pressure that led to these wage
increases. As with the minimum wage compliance analysis above, in order to
accurately address this question one must control for plant or worker character-
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F I G U R E 7. Average Change in Salary for Unskilled Workers in Indonesia between 1990 and
1996 by Foreign Ownership, Export Status, and Sector ($US 1996 Constant)
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istics across firms. Therefore, once again a multivariate regression analysis was
necessary.
In order to accomplish this, we first had to create a variable to serve as
a "proxy" for anti-sweatshop activism. We identified the districts throughout
Indonesia where foreign and exporting TFA plants (e.g., Nike, Reebok, Adidas)
were located that received media attention and were central to the anti-sweat-
shop campaigns. We then examined plants with foreign ownership and export
status in these districts in order to identify the changes in wages in these "treat-
ment" plants, controlling for all other factors that also influence wages.
We employed various regression specifications and the results were
largely consistent throughout: wages increased systematically more for exporting and
foreign TFA plants in districts where activists concentrated their efforts."^ Real wages rose
an additional 20 to 25 percent more between 1990 and 1996 for TFA foreign-
owned plants and exporters in regions with activism relative to other foreign or
exporting TFA firms. In addition, our results suggest that the increase in the real
minimum wage accounted for an approximately 25 percent increase in real
wages throughout the entire Indonesia manufacturing sector. We found no
effea on the wages of skilled workers in foreign or exporting firms in these dis-
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tricts, indicating as predicted that the effects of activism were centered solely on
the base wages of the lowest paid, unskilled workers.
In summary, the above analysis suggests that the combined effects of the
minimum wage legislation and the anti-sweatshop campaigns led to as much as
a 50 percent increase in real wages and a 100 percent increase in nominal wages
for unskilled workers in targeted exporting or foreign-owned plants.
The Employment Effects of Rising Wages in Indonesia
Standard economic theory predicts that minimum wages increases should
lead to a fall in employment, based on simple supply and demand.'" If this is the
case, then mandated wage increases may benefit workers who retain their jobs,
but also lead to increased unemployment, and therefore overall effects on
employees is unclear. In Table 2, we repeat the type of analysis presented in
Table 1 to examine the changes in employment in Indonesia during the period
1990-1996.
Columns 1 through 3 in Table 2 report changes in employment for plants
outside of the textiles, footwear, and apparel seaor. Columns 4 through 6 report
employment changes in TFA plants, and columns 7 through 9 report the "differ-
ence-in-differences" between 1990 and 1996. While employment in domestic
TFA firms remained essentially constant, both the exporting and foreign-owned
TFA plants experienced very large increases in employment. In row 3 columns 8
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F I G U R E 8. Average Change in Employment for Indonesia Firms between 1990 and 1996
by Foreign Ownership, Export Status, and Sector
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and 9, we see that exporting and foreign TFA plants increased employment by
300 to almost 500 more workers than foreign-owned and exporting plants in
the non-TFA sectors. These results, which are displayed in Figure 8, suggest
that the targeted aaivism centered on TFA enterprises did not appear to hurt
employment, at least relative to the growth in employment in other sectors.
In fact, Figure 8 makes clear that employment growth was significantly higher
within exporting and foreign TFA plants, relative to other plants outside of that
sector. ^ ^
However, our results indicate a strong negative impact of the minimum
wage increase on employment growth. The doubling of the real value of the
minimum wage was accompanied by a 10 percentage point decline in employ-
ment in Indonesia. This represents a high cost in terms of foregone employment.
The only enterprises not affected by the rising minimum were small plants,
defined as enterprises with fewer than 100 employees. One reason is that rates
of compliance with the minimum wage legislation among small plants were
much lower.
Although minimum wage increases were responsible for significant
declines in employment across virtually all of Indonesian manufacturing.
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F I G U R E 9. Total Production Worker Employment 1990-1996
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activism targeted at surviving textiles, footwear, and apparel was not. Trends in
aggregate employment for TFA and non-TFA firms confirm this. In Figure 9,'^
we show total unskilled employment in Indonesia during the sample period.
Employment growth for the foreign and exporting TFA seaors not only rose
more in percentage terms than for non-TFA firms, but foreign TFA firms did
not experience any decline in employment during the entire sample period.
The rather surprising finding that both wages increased dramatically in
the foreign and exporting TFA sectors as well as employment can be (partially)
explained by the faa that Indonesia is one of the lowest cost producers in the
world, with labor costs only a small fraction of the total costs of production. To
put things in perspective, a nominal wage increase of 100 percent implies
employers would have to double wages of around 50 cents an hour to one
dollar an hour. Given that Nike shoes commonly sell from 100-200 dollars, this
increase in labor costs is not likely to have a large impaa on profits. Labor costs
typically account for less than 5 percent of the sales price of a Nike shoe. The
costs to Nike were further cushioned by the fact that product demand was grow-
ing. Throughout the 1990s, as Nike increased spending on wages and expensive
public relations campaigns to mend its image, its market share of the global
footwear market rose by almost 50 percent.**
VOL 48. NO.2 WINTER 2006 157
Improving the Conditions of Workers? Minimum Wage L
Conclusions
During the 1990s, anti-sweatshop activists increased their efforts to
improve working conditions and raise wages for workers in developing coun-
tries. Indonesia, home to dozens of Nike, Reebok, and Adidas subcontractors,
was a primary target for these activists. At the same time, the Indonesian gov-
ernment (prompted by the U.S. government) greatly increased the minimum
wage throughout Indonesia. This article analyzed the impact of these two differ-
ent types of interventions on labor market outcomes in Indonesian manufactur-
ing. The results suggest that the more than doubling of the real value of the
minimum wage resulted in a 35 percent increase in real wages for unskilled
workers between 1990 and 1996. The anti-sweatshop campaigns also had a sig-
nificant impact on wages. Our research suggests that unskilled real wages
increased by an additional 20 percent for exporters and multinational plants in
sweatshop industries, defined as textiles, footwear, and apparel.
The combined effects of the minimum wage legislation and the anti-
sweatshop campaigns led to more than a 50 percent increase in real wages and a
doubling of nominal wages for unskilled workers at targeted exporting plants.
One question that naturally arises is how this could possibly be achieved with-
out adverse consequences for employment.'"^ In our research, we tested whether
these higher wages led firms to cut employment or shut down operations. The
minimum wage increases led to employment losses of as much as 10 percentage
points for unskilled workers across all sectors in manufacturing. Surprisingly,
however, anti-sweatshop activism did not have significant adverse effects on
employment in the TFA sectors. The fact that wages soared and employment
remained steady in textiles and apparel suggests that the anti-sweatshop move-
ment had a positive impact on workers in these factories. This is a surprising and
unintuitive result that suggests that anti-sweatshop activism in Indonesia was a
"win-win" situation. Despite the rising labor costs during this period, increased
market demand for textile, footwear, and apparel products led to net employ-
ment increases in foreign and exporting firms.
Since our study focused on a relatively small time period, such gains
could be temporary. Foreign firms such as Nike have already begun shifting pro-
duction to other low-wage countries throughout Southeast Asia, such as China,
Vietnam, and Cambodia. It also remains an open question as to whether
activism targeted at other sectors in Indonesia could be as successful. Wages
in apparel and garment factories were very low prior to the onset of the anti-
sweatshop campaigns. This meant that subcontractors for Nike were able to
implement significant wage increases before even approaching the average
wages across the Indonesian manufacturing sector. One implication is that anti-
sweatshop activists correctly targeted some of the lowest paid workers in the
country. Another key consideration is that many of the goods produced in
Indonesia's TFA sectors ultimately end up in expensive retail markets in the U.S.
and the EU, where profit margins are relatively large, brand identity is
paramount, and the firms clearly have the financial resources to improve labor
conditions in their factories.'^ In industries where more firms compete for mar-
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ket share, where profit margins are smaller, and there is no brand recognition,
anti-sweatshop campaigns may not be as effective.
Notes
1. For another view that suggests that anti-sweatshop activism is bad for workers, see the work
by the Academic Consortium on International Trade (ACIT) at
<www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/acit>.
2. Teri L. Caraway, "Solidarity across Borders: Transnational Labor Activism and Empowering
Workers in Indonesia," prepared for the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 2001.
3. B.J. Bullert, "Strategic Public Relations, Sweatshops, and the Making of a Glohal Move-
ment," Working Paper #2000-14. The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and
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